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Minority rights in post-war Iraq: An impending catastrophe? 
Bill Bowring University of London 
Abstract 
Many commentators see Iraq as divided between Sunni, Shia and Kurds – and perhaps a few 
Turkmen. Nothing could be further from the truth. Iraq also has significant populations of 
Baha’is, Christians, Faili Kurds, Mandaeans, Palestinians, Shabak and Yezidis. Some of 
Iraq’s minority groups have been present in the region for more than two millennia. But they 
now face the threat of eradication in or expulsion from their ancient homeland. Since 2006, 
the situation has deteriorated. To make matters worse, the international law of minority and 
group rights has largely developed in the context of the recent history of Europe, and, 
perhaps, has little to contribute to the situation in Iraq. This article asks what role, if any, can 
international law, notably the law of human rights, minority rights and group rights, play in 
resolving or mitigating conflict. This is especially the case when the underlying rationale of 
this law is so problematic. The structure of this article is as follows. I start with an overview of 
the various minority groups in Iraq. There is a common theme – things have got a lot worse 
since 2003. Next, I explore Iraq’s statehood, that it is a recent construct, a product of British 
imperial ambition and cynicism. In fact, Mesopotamia, the territory of contemporary Iraq, was 
a Persian territory for many centuries until its conquest by militant Islam, its glorious role in 
the Golden Age of Islam (contemporaneous with Western Europe’s dark ages) and 
incorporation into the Ottoman Empire. Third, I reflect on Britain’s disastrous adventures in 
the region. Mesopotamia was the scene of Britain’s greatest military disaster; but Britain has 
been responsible for the unceasing violence and persecution which characterizes modern 
Iraq. Fourth, I turn to a marvellous dream, a document of extraordinary cogency and 
unreality: Iraq’s 1932 Declaration, on admission to the League of Nations. This document is a 
tragic mirage: an Iraq of respect for and enjoyment of its cosmopolitan diversity. It is 
significant that the only two occasions on which such a vision achieved a purchase in 
Mesopotamia were the short periods of Kemalist and Communist rule. For Britain and the 
United States such a trajectory was utterly impermissible. Fifth, I turn to the fact that Iraq was 
one of the first members of the United Nations, and ratified all the relevant human rights 
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instruments dealing with minority rights. Iraq was until the 1990s an assiduous participant in 
the UN human rights mechanisms, submitting periodical reports to the treaty bodies and 
submitting itself to interrogation in Geneva, followed by concluding observations and 
recommendations. This continued despite the eight years’ war with Iran, the disastrous 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the long years of sanctions, blockade and continuous aerial 
attack, reminiscent of Britain’s reliance on the RAF during and after the Mandate. Finally, 
there is Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, a joke version of the 1932 Declaration. At the same time, 
since 1999 Iraq has not engaged with the UN human rights mechanisms. My conclusion is 
not sanguine. 
Keywords 
minority rights, international law, conflict, Iraq, League of Nations 
Introduction 
Many commentators see Iraq as divided between Sunni, Shia and Kurds – 
and perhaps a few Turkmen. Nothing could be further from the truth. Iraq also 
has significant populations of Baha’is, Christians, Faili Kurds, Mandaeans, 
Palestinians, Shabak and Yezidis. As Preti Taneja of Minority Rights Group 
points out, some of Iraq’s minority groups have been present in the region for 
more than two millennia. However, they now face the threat of eradication 
from their ancient homeland (Taneja 2007). Sunni–Shia violence has 
diminished, but as Minority Rights Group’s latest ‘Peoples Under Threat’ 
report shows, the tension between Kurds and Arabs over disputed territories 
in the north now means that Nineveh and Kirkuk, where many of the smaller 
minority communities live, have become Iraq’s most dangerous governorates. 
Chaldo-Assyrians, Shabak, Turkmen and Yezidis have all suffered violent 
attack in the last year and remain gravely at ‘risk of mass displacement’ 
(Minority Rights Group 2010). Bomb attacks in May 2010 led commentators 
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to highlight the ‘unrelenting plight of Iraq’s Christians’ (Goodenough 2010). In 
2006, Makau Mutua, he himself a profound critic of the discourse of human 
rights, argued that ‘[…] only a popularly legitimate accommodation of minority 
and group rights in a democratic constitutional framework, a virtually 
impossible challenge, can avert the disintegration of Iraq’ (Mutua 2006: 928). 
Without such a process Iraq is threatened with collapse or bloodshed and 
flight on a horrifying scale. Since 2006, the situation has only deteriorated. To 
make matters worse, the international law of minority and group rights has 
largely developed in the context of the recent history of Europe, and, perhaps, 
has little to contribute to the situation in Iraq. 
This article asks what role, if any, can international law, notably the law 
of human rights, minority rights and group rights, play in resolving or 
mitigating conflict, especially when the underlying rationale of this law is so 
problematic. Minority Rights Group International has provided three excellent, 
thoroughly researched reports on Iraq, including Preti Taneja’s (2007) 
‘Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq’s Minority Communities Since 2003’, 
Chris Chapman and Preti Taneja’s (2009) ‘Uncertain Refuge, Dangerous 
Return: Iraq’s Uprooted Minorities’ and Mumtaz Lalani’s (2010) ‘Still Targeted: 
Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities’. Human Rights Watch (2009, 
2010, 2011) has also published three detailed reports. The reader is referred 
to these reports for a wealth of accurate information and many poignant case 
studies. 
The structure of this article is as follows. I start with an overview, 
drawing from Lalani’s work for Minority Rights Group, of the various minority 
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groups in Iraq. There is a common theme – things have become much worse 
since 2003. Next, I explore Iraq’s statehood, that it is a recent construct, a 
product of British imperial ambition and cynicism. In fact, Mesopotamia, the 
territory of contemporary Iraq, was a Persian territory for many centuries until 
its conquest by militant Islam, its glorious role in the Golden Age of Islam 
(contemporaneous with Western Europe’s dark ages) and incorporation into 
the Ottoman Empire. What is most characteristic of Iraq’s history, however, is 
its rich cosmopolitanism, especially its Jewish heritage. 
Third, I reflect on Britain’s disastrous adventures in the region. 
Mesopotamia was the scene of Britain’s greatest military disaster; but Britain 
has been responsible for the unceasing violence and persecution which 
characterizes modern Iraq. Fourth, I turn to a marvellous dream, a document 
of extraordinary cogency and unreality: Iraq’s 1932 Declaration, on admission 
to the League of Nations. This document is a tragic mirage: an Iraq of respect 
for and enjoyment of its cosmopolitan diversity. It is significant that the only 
two occasions on which such a vision achieved a purchase in Mesopotamia 
were the short periods of Kemalist and Communist rule. For Britain and the 
United States, such a trajectory was utterly impermissible. 
Fifth, I turn to the fact that Iraq was one of the first members of the 
United Nations and ratified all the relevant human rights instruments dealing 
with minority rights. Until the 1990s, Iraq was an assiduous participant in the 
UN human rights mechanisms, submitting periodical reports to the treaty 
bodies and submitting itself to interrogation in Geneva, followed by concluding 
observations and recommendations. This continued despite the eight years of 
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war with Iran, the disastrous invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the long years of 
sanctions, blockade and continuous aerial attack, reminiscent of Britain’s 
reliance on the Royal Air Force during and after the Mandate. Finally, there is 
Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, a joke version of the 1932 Declaration. At the same 
time, since 1999, Iraq has not engaged with the UN human rights 
mechanisms. My conclusion is not sanguine. 
Minorities in Iraq and the catastrophe following 2003 
Most reporting of Iraq tends to assume that there are three groups of interest 
to an observer, Shia, Sunni and Kurds, and that Iraq, already effectively 
divided into two in view of the Kurdish autonomy, may well split into three 
separate entities. However, Lalani (2010: 5) points out that the Iraqi 
population is extremely diverse in terms of ethnicity and religion. ‘In addition 
to the three larger groups – Kurds, Shi’a Arabs and Sunni Arabs – 
communities of Armenians, Bahá’ís, Black Iraqis, Chaldo-Assyrians, 
Circassians, Faili Kurds, Jews, Kaka’i, Palestinians, Roma, Sabian 
Mandaeans, Shabaks, Turkmen and Yazidis are to be found.’ 
However, it must be borne in mind that the demography of Iraq is 
overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim. According to the CIA Factbook for 2010,1 
the composition of the population of some 30,500,000 people was Arab 75–
80 per cent, Kurdish 15–20 per cent and Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5 per 
cent. Religious belief was reported as Muslim 97 per cent (Shia 60–65 per 
cent, Sunni 32–37 per cent) and Christian or other 3 per cent. Significant 
language use was Arabic (official), Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), 
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Turkoman (a Turkish dialect), Assyrian (Neo-Aramaic) and Armenian (CIA 
2010a). 
Thus, taking the various minorities in alphabetical order, there are no more 
than 1000 Bahá’ís, members of 
what is described by adherents as the youngest of the world’s 
independent religions. Its founder, Bahá’u’lláh (1817–92), is regarded by 
Bahá’ís as the most recent in the line of Messengers of God. Many 
Muslims consider Bahá’ís as apostates or heretics due to their belief in a 
post-Islamic religion. 
(Lalani 2010: 5) 
However, there may be as many as two million Black Iraqis from East Africa 
concentrated in Basra and Sadr City. According to Lalani, they suffer 
discrimination and are often referred to as abd or ‘slave’. 
There are very few remaining Chaldo-Assyrians, but they are truly indigenous 
people of the region. With the Armenians, they form the Christian population 
of Iraq. Lalani cites the Brookings Institution to the effect that Christians in 
Iraq numbered between 1 million and 1.4 million in 2003 (Ferris and Stoltz 
2008). By 2010, as a result of extreme violence and persecution, most have 
fled, and only an estimated 500,000 are reported to remain (US Commission 
on International Religious Freedom 2010). 
Other minorities that are also smaller in number are in a precarious state (all 
statistics are from Lalani 2010: 5–6). The 2000 or so Circassians, who are 
Sunni Muslims, came to Iraq following the genocide of the North Caucasus 
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Circassians in 1864 at the hands of the Russian Empire. It is not known how 
many Faili Kurds, Shia Muslims, remain in Iraq. They lived along the Iran–Iraq 
border and were also active in business and politics in Baghdad but were 
persecuted by the Ba’ath regime, and many fled to Iran. Once there were as 
many as 150,000 Jews in Iraq, but very few remain. Persecution of Jews in 
Iraq grew substantially worse after 2003. On the other hand, it is believed that 
there are as many as 200,000 Kaka’i Kurds, also known as Ahl-e Haqq, living 
in Iraq, mostly around Kirkuk. They speak a separate language called Macho. 
They have a distinctive faith, ‘Kakaism’, meaning ‘brotherhood’, which 
combines Zoroastrianism and Shi’ism, similar to Yazidism. Since their religion 
does not permit them to curse Satan, many Muslims regard them as devil-
worshippers. There remain 10–15,000 Palestinians of Sunni religion living in 
Iraq since 1948. While their presence was welcomed by the Ba’ath Party, 
they have been persecuted since 2003. Roma, about 60,000 strong, are 
known as Kawliyah in Iraq, and are Muslims, both Sunni and Shia. The Ba’ath 
regime allowed them to pursue occupations such as playing music, dancing, 
prostitution and selling alcohol, forbidden to other Muslims; but they too have 
been persecuted since 2003. There are perhaps 5000 Sabian Mandaeans left 
in Iraq, followers of an ancient Gnostic religion, whose central prophet is John 
the Baptist. There are now 60–70,000 living outside Iraq, in Jordan, Syria and 
elsewhere, many having been killed and forced to leave since 2003. As Lalani 
(2010: 5) points out, they soon may be eradicated from Iraq altogether. The 
Shabak people claim to have resided continuously in the territory of Iraq since 
1502, mainly in the Nineveh plains, between the Tigris and Khazir. They are 
Sunni and Shia Muslims, and it is not known how many there are, possibly 
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between 200,000 and 500,000. Kurds insist that the Shabak are Kurdish, and 
some Shabak agree. Since 2004, Shabak groups have reported to the United 
Nations that more than 750 of their community members have perished in 
armed attacks. 
Before 2003 there were between 600,000 and two million Turkmen, the third 
largest ethnic group in Iraq, living in the north in towns and villages stretching 
from Tel Afar, west of Mosul, through Mosul, Erbil, Altun Kopru, Kirkuk, Taza 
Khurmatu, Kifri and Khaniqin. About 60 per cent are Sunni, with the 
remainder Ithna’ashari or other Shia. Although they have a distinctive 
language, they are rapidly assimilating and are no longer tribally organized. 
They claim the city of Kirkuk, but a referendum on Kirkuk should have taken 
place in 2007, but has not yet occurred. They too have been persecuted since 
2003 (Lalani 2010: 7). 
The numbers of Yazidis have reportedly fallen from 700,000 in 2005 to 
approximately 500,000 today. They live primarily in Jabal Sinjar, 115 km west 
of Mosul, with a smaller community in Shaikhan, in Nineveh governorate east 
of Mosul, where their holiest shrine of Shaykh Adi is located. Their religion is 
4000 years old and combines pre-Islamic, Zoroastrian, Manichaean, Jewish, 
Nestorian Christian and Muslim elements. They are dualists, believing in a 
Creator God, who is now passive, and in Malak Ta’us (the Peacock Angel), 
who executes divine will (Minority Rights Group 2008). As a result, many 
Muslims consider the Yazidis too to be devil-worshippers, and since 2003 
they have been subject to persecution. In August 2007 four coordinated 
suicide truck bombings destroyed two Yazidi towns, killing at least 400 
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civilians, wounding 1562 and leaving more than 1000 families homeless 
(Lalani 2010: 8). 
The overall picture, therefore, is of escalating persecution since 2003 and of 
dramatic falls in the populations of the respective minorities. This persecution 
is the direct if perhaps unintended consequence of the illegal invasion and 
occupation of Iraq by the United States, United Kingdom and the ‘coalition’ 
(Bowring 2008: Chapters 2 and 3). In 2008 Michael Youash wrote, 
The legislative and political setbacks to minorities from August 2008 to the 
present, combined with the concerted effort to kill Christian Assyrians in 
Mosul, internally-displacing over 3,000 families in a matter of days, reflects 
the emptiness of the policy to improve minorities’ suffering by making Iraq 
a safer place. 
(Youash 2008: 374) 
In April 2010, Amnesty International published an authoritative report, ‘Iraq: 
Civilians Under Fire’ (Amnesty 2010). This, like the Human Rights Watch 
reports, gives poignant and documented details of specific cases of 
persecution and killing on ethnic and religious grounds, commencing 
immediately after the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
Iraq – a British imperial construct 
The snapshot presented in the previous section conveys accurately Iraq’s 
remarkable heterogeneity, at any rate pre-2003. If present-day persecution of 
those minorities is a consequence of 2003, the logic of the events that led 
inexorably to this result was put in place by the British Empire. This is, 
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therefore, the point in my article in which some reverse chronology is in order. 
Nelida Fuccaro (1997: 560–61) accurately pointed out in 1997 that 
Like all other colonial states in the Middle East that came into 
existence in the aftermath of World War I, monarchical Iraq (1921–
1958) was not a homogenous socio-political system. The modern state 
of Iraq was an artificial creation of Great Britain, the Mandatory power 
between 1920 and 1932. In theory, British colonial supervision 
guaranteed the development of a modern nation-state in a new entity 
that united the former Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra and 
Mosul. In practice, it supported state building only when that was 
consistent with British colonial and imperial interests. 
Charles Townsend too declared in his account of Britain’s Iraq disaster that ‘It 
is no exaggeration to say that modern Iraq was created, deliberately and 
unilaterally, by the British over the seven years following their first invasion in 
1914. Recent history contains few examples of such dramatic and fateful 
intervention’ (Townsend 2010: xxi). 
The creation of the British mandate in Mesopotamia was itself the result of 
some particularly dirty dealing between Britain and France immediately after 
World War I. Negotiating the Treaty of Paris in 1919, as Margaret MacMillan 
points out (MacMillan 2002: 397–98; see for a summary Harty 2006), Britain 
and France began – and this was without historical precedent – to refer to the 
area that comprises contemporary Iraq as a single territory, Mesopotamia, 
stretching from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south with Baghdad in the 
middle. These cities gave their identity to the three Ottoman provinces. For 
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entirely cynical reasons, Britain and France were content to treat these three 
provinces as a unit, in the context of the creation of the French mandate in 
Syria and Lebanon, and Britain in Palestine. There was no ‘Mesopotamian 
people’. Basra had links with India, Baghdad with Persia, and Mosul with 
Turkey and Syria. While these cities were thoroughly cosmopolitan, the 
regions surrounding them were tribally organized and led by religious 
factions: half Shia Muslim, a quarter Sunni Muslim and the rest Jews, 
Christians and the others described above. Those were only the religious 
divisions: half the population were also Arab, and the rest were Kurds and 
Persians. There was no shared nationalism. Arab nationalism in Iraq came 
later. 
The key factor, not for the first time, was oil, especially since Winston 
Churchill ordered the conversion of the British navy from coal to oil. The oil 
concession in Mesopotamia was given to the British-controlled Turkish 
Petroleum Company (TPC), which had held concessionary rights to the Mosul 
wilaya (province) (see Earle 1924). The demise of the Ottoman Empire gave 
the Kurds a real chance of seizing control of the oil fields, and Iraqis were 
therefore content with a British Mandate covering all three provinces. In 
March 1925, the TPC was renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and 
was granted a concession for a period of 75 years (see, among many other 
sources, Saul 2007). 
In a further irony, Mesopotamia was in fact a province of the Persian Empire 
for four centuries until the Islamic conquest of the seventh century AD. In the 
sixth century BC, Cyrus the Great of Persia defeated the Neo-Babylonian 
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Empire at the Battle of Opis, and Mesopotamia became part of the 
Achaemenid Persian Empire for nearly four centuries. In the late fourth 
century BC, Alexander the Great conquered Mesopotamia, inaugurating two 
centuries of Hellenistic Seleucid rule. The Parthians conquered the region 
during the reign of Mithridates of Parthia (r. 171–138 BC). The Roman Empire 
invaded several times from Syria. Finally, the Sassanid Persians under 
Ardashir I conquered the region in 224 AD, bringing the Parthian Empire to an 
end. This was, therefore, a return to Persian rule, which was in many ways 
the norm (see Mieroop 2006; Nissen and Heine 2009). 
It is therefore no surprise that the Iraqi Ba’ath Party – the Arab Socialist 
Ba'ath (renaissance) Party was founded in Syria in 1947 – was defined by 
Arab nationalism confronting Imperial Iran. Iran was presented in the regime’s 
narrative, its presentation within Iraq and for western consumption, as the 
age-old enemy of the Arabs (Halliday 2000: 117–18). 
The British disaster – for Britain and for the minorities 
Townsend’s recent book (2010) is aptly entitled When God Made Hell. For the 
present author, it was truly astonishing that in 2003 Britain’s leaders decided 
to repeat Britain’s humiliating experience in Iraq. Britain’s challenge to the 
Ottoman Empire started with disaster. On 29 April 1916, the British garrison 
under General Townsend in the southern Iraq town of Kut surrendered 
unconditionally to the Ottoman forces, after a siege lasting 147 days. James 
Morris described this as ‘the most abject capitulation in Britain's military 
history’. Various relief efforts cost the lives of around 23,000 Allied and 
around 10,000 Ottoman soldiers. Around 13,000 Allied soldiers survived the 
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siege only to become prisoners. Seventy per cent of the British and 50 per 
cent of the Indian troops died of disease or at the hands of the Ottoman 
guards during captivity (Morris 1980: 164–72). 
Having relinquished dreams of incorporating Mesopotamia into British India, 
Britain settled for the League of Nations Mandate. Britain used its traditional 
policies of ethnic divide and rule. Andreas Wimmer points out (2003: 116; 
citing Batata 1978: 176, 186) that 
[T]he politics of ethnicity dominated from the very moment when the 
British installed the Hashemite Faizal of the Hijaz, the commander of 
the Arab forces that contributed to the defeat of the Ottoman armies in 
the Middle East, as the king of Iraq. [Sunni Arabs] dominated politics in 
the first decades of independence, providing almost half of the 
premiers appointed during the mandate (1921 to 1932) and the 
monarchy (1932 to 1958) – the rest coming from old Ottoman 
bureaucratic families or the Sunni notables of Baghdad. Only 4 out of 
the 23 individuals appointed as premiers during that period were of Shii 
background. 
The same was increasingly true of the armed forces. 
Indeed, the model of ethnic and religious exclusion installed by Britain was 
broken only on two occasions. In 1936–37 Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr attempted 
to follow the example of Kemalist Turkey, with a commitment to an explicitly 
multi-ethnic Iraqi nationalism. The Kurdish language, Shia religion and a 
variety of ethnic symbols were recognized as part of Iraq’s heritage. When 
Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the Iraqi monarchy on 14 July 1958, he based 
 14 
his rule to a large extent on the Communist Party, which was able to mobilize 
the suburbs and to include representatives of the largest ethno-religious 
groups within its Central Committees. The Free Officers led by Qasim sought 
to bring about social reforms, including a serious attempt at land reform and 
to end the principle of indirect rule in tribal areas. Qasim had Kurdish 
ancestry, and promoted an understanding of Iraq as a multi-ethnic national 
state (Batata 1978; Wimmer 2003). In 1963, Qasim was overthrown by a 
Ba’ath coup with the support of Britain and the United States, and shot. In the 
context of the Cold War the perceived communist threat was paramount for 
Britain and the United Kingdom, just as the Iranian revolutionary threat from 
1979 meant that Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party received very 
substantial material and political support from the former colonial power. 
The Jews were the most characteristic victims of British policy. Townsend 
(2010: 6) observes that inter-war Iraq had a very small overall population, of 
just two million, with big communities of Kurds, Christians and Jews in the 
north, and one of the world’s biggest urban Jewish communities in Baghdad 
itself; these minorities outnumbered Arabs. ‘For the Jews of Baghdad, who 
formed a majority of the city’s inhabitants in 1917, Britain’s failure to preserve 
minority protection (which they had enjoyed for centuries under Ottoman rule) 
would prove catastrophic’ (Townsend 2010: 526). 
The dream of the League of Nations 
The policies of Bakr and Qasim echoed a remarkable document, the 
Declaration of the Kingdom of Iraq made at Baghdad on 30 May 1932 on the 
occasion of the termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq, and containing 
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the guarantees given to the Council of the League of Nations by the Iraqi 
government (Iraq’s Genesis and Current Status in Documents n.d. together 
with many other documents). Paragraphs 2–10 contain a comprehensive set 
of specific minority rights. Article 2 proclaims radical non-discrimination: 
 1. Full and complete protection of life and liberty will be assured to all 
inhabitants of Iraq without distinction of birth, nationality, language, 
race or religion. 
2. All inhabitants of Iraq will be entitled to the free exercise, whether 
public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are 
not inconsistent with public order or public morals. 
Article 4 (5), including electoral and other rights, showed that while Arabic and 
Kurdish were recognized as the major languages, other languages should be 
given recognition: 
(5) Notwithstanding the establishment by the Iraqi Government of 
Arabic as the official language, and notwithstanding the special 
arrangements to be made by the Iraqi Government, under Article 9 of 
the present Declaration, regarding the use of the Kurdish and Turkish 
languages, adequate facilities will be given to all Iraqi nationals whose 
mother tongue is not the official language, for the use of their 
language, either orally or in writing, before the courts. 
Article 8 contained provisions for mother tongue education that are as 
comprehensive as the post-1990 Council of Europe standards: 
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1. In the public educational system in towns and districts in which are 
resident a considerable proportion of Iraqi nationals whose mother 
tongue is not the official language, the Iraqi Government will make 
provision for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools 
instruction shall be given to the children of such nationals through the 
medium of their own language; it being understood that this provision 
does not prevent the Iraqi Government from making the teaching of 
Arabic obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Iraqi 
nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these 
minorities will be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and 
application of sums which may be provided out of public funds under 
the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious or 
charitable purposes. 
Article 10 provided for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. 
However splendid these words, the reality was, as Toby Dodge points out, the 
emergence of a quasi-state as the result of irresoluble tensions inherent in 
British nation-building. Even though Iraq entered the League of Nations as a 
self-determining nation state, in fact it was a territory 
inhabited by a diverse and divided population run by a small clique of 
mainly Sunni politicians who could not control the country without the help 
of British airplanes […] The commitments previously given to the League 
by both Britain and Iraq concerning the inclusion of and comity among the 
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different ethnic and religious communities were discarded to achieve 
Iraq’s formal independence as quickly as possible. 
(Dodge 2005: 31) 
Iraq’s minority rights obligations in international law 
Iraq was admitted to the United Nations on 21 December 1945. In December 
1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Iraq acceded to the Genocide 
Convention on 20 January 1959. On 25 January 1971, Iraq was one of the 
first states to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Article 26 of the Covenant prohibits discrimination on grounds of 
race, religion and language, and Article 27 is specifically dedicated to the 
rights of minorities: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language. 
On 28 November 1996, Iraq submitted its fourth periodic report (UN Human 
Rights Committee 1996).2 In paragraphs 84–86 Iraq insisted that 'persons 
belonging to minorities were enjoying their rights without any discrimination 
and that Iraq was endeavouring to further enhance those rights’. It also 
complained bitterly of the situation brought about by the United States and the 
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United Kingdom following the conflict in 1991, especially as concerned the 
Kurds. Iraq concluded, 
The best way to enable the Iraqi Kurds to enjoy their rights is through 
positive dialogue, without any external interference, between the political 
leadership and the Kurdish leaders in such a way as to promote the 
human rights of all citizens within a united Iraq. 
The Human Rights Committee, the Treaty Body for the ICCPR, provided its 
Concluding Observations on 19 November 1997 (UN Human Rights 
Committee 1997). The Committee welcomed ‘the State party’s fourth periodic 
report, and notes its timely submission and the willingness of Iraq to have a 
continued dialogue with the Committee’, although regretted Iraq’s failure to 
deal with the ‘actual state of implementation of domestic laws and of the 
Covenant, nor with the difficulties encountered in the course of their 
implementation’. It also noted the difficulties caused for Iraq by the eight 
years’ war with Iran, and the suffering and death caused by sanctions and 
blockades, especially for children. 
Paragraph 20 is of particular significance: 
20. The Committee expresses concern about the situation of members 
of religious and ethnic minorities, as well as other groups which are the 
subject of discrimination in Iraq, in particular the Shi’ite people in the 
Southern Marshes and the Kurds. The Committee also regrets the lack 
of information on the situation of other minorities, such as the Turkeman, 
Assyrian, Chaldean and Christian minorities, and on the enjoyment of 
their rights under articles 26 and 27 of the Covenant. In this connection, 
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the Committee calls attention to its General Comment No. 23 (50) on 
article 27 of the Covenant. Further: 
The Committee recommends that measures be taken to ensure full 
equality of rights for members of all religious groups as well as ethnic 
and linguistic minorities, and that information be provided in the State 
party’s next periodic report on the implementation of articles 26 and 27 
of the Covenant. 
Iraq has not submitted a report since 1996. 
Iraq also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on 25 January 1971. It submitted periodical reports 
in 1993 (the second) and 1996 (the third). 
Iraq has undertaken obligations to protect minority rights through other UN 
conventions. Thus, on 14 January 1970 Iraq ratified the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 
Iraq was an assiduous reporter, submitting its twelfth and thirteenth reports, 
due in 1993 and 1995, in 1996; and its fourteenth report, due in 1997, on 11 
February 1999 (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
CERD 1999). In paragraph 74 Iraq declared, 
The Iraqi State has recognized not only the legitimate ethnic rights of 
the Kurds but also the rights of other minorities, such as the 
Turkomans and the various Syriac-speaking communities. 
It drew the Committee’s attention to a number of important documents: 
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Decree No. 89 of 1970 recognizing the cultural rights of the Turkoman 
minority. This focused especially on print and TV media in the 
Turkoman language. 
Decree No. 251 of 1972 recognizing the cultural rights of Syriac-
speakers. Syriac-speaking citizens belonging to the Assyrian, 
Chaldean and East Syrian communities were to have instruction in 
Syriac at primary schools, and taught as a subject in secondary 
schools. 
The Committee provided its Concluding Observations on 12 April 2001 (UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2001), and stated 
(paragraph 7), 
It is noted with interest that the State party remains committed to the 
declaration of 1970 which recognized the ethnic, cultural and 
administrative rights of Kurdish citizens in the areas in which they 
constituted a majority, as well as to the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional 
Autonomy Act of 1974 by which the Autonomous Region was 
established as a separate administrative unit endowed with distinct 
personality. The laws and regulations aiming at protecting the cultural 
identity of the Turkoman minority and the Syriac-speaking community, 
dating back to the 1970s, are also commended. 
However, in paragraphs 12 and 13 it expressed concern: 
12. Concern is also expressed over allegations that the non-Arab 
population living in the Kirkuk and Khanaquin areas, especially the 
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Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians, have been subjected by local Iraqi 
authorities to measures such as forced relocation, denial of equal 
access to employment and educational opportunities and limitations in 
the exercise of their rights linked to the ownership of real estate. 
13. It is also noted with concern that the situation prevailing in the 
northern governorates has caused much suffering and the forced 
displacement of a large part of the population, including for members 
of ethnic groups living in the area. 
Likewise, Iraq has provided no report since 1999. 
On 15 June 1994, Iraq acceded to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. This convention later specifically requires in Articles 29 and 30 that the 
education of a child must be directed to the 'development of […] his or her 
own cultural identity, language and values’, and gives a child of a religious 
minority the right 'to enjoy his or her own culture, [and] to profess and practise 
his or her own religion’. 
Iraq entered a reservation to the Convention, as follows: 
The Government of Iraq has seen fit to accept [the Convention] […] 
subject to a reservation in respect to article 14, paragraph 1, 
concerning the child's freedom of religion, as allowing a child to change 
his or her religion runs counter to the provisions of the Islamic Shariah. 
Iraq submitted an initial report, which was considered by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child on 23–24 September 1998. The Committee adopted 
its Concluding Observations on 26 October 1998 (UN Committee on the 
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Rights of the Child 1998). While expressing its concern at Iraq’s reservation, 
the Committee made no comment on the question of education or religion. 
Iraq has not provided any further report. 
On 16 February 2010, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva conducted its 
periodic review of Iraq (UN Human Rights Council 2010a). The Iraqi Human 
Rights Minister Wijdan Salim attended the periodic review working group 
session. One of the Council’s primary recommendations was that Iraq ‘Take 
measures to promote and protect the rights of minorities’. The National 
Report was dated 18 January 2010 (UN Human Rights Council 2010b), and 
contained the following: 
55. As far as minority rights are concerned, the Constitution 
guarantees the rights of all minorities, including freedom of belief and 
freedom of religion (art. 2), freedom of thought, conscience and belief 
(art. 42) and freedom of worship (art. 43). It also guarantees cultural 
rights and linguistic identity (art. 4), prohibiting all forms of racism and 
discrimination (art. 7) and guaranteeing freedom of choice in respect of 
personal status based on religion, faith group, belief or preference (art. 
41). 
56. Minorities have been subjected to a number of grave violations, 
largely at the hands of terrorist groups and outlawed militias. In some 
isolated incidents, they have also been targeted as individuals or as a 
group. Places in which minorities are represented, including places of 
worship, have also been targeted, with the result that some have been 
forced to flee to other parts of the country or abroad. The Government 
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of National Unity has taken various measures to provide protection and 
emergency aid to vulnerable minorities, together with compensation for 
victims. 
57. The Government has adopted a policy to support the rights and 
freedoms of minorities in keeping with the guarantees set out in the 
Constitution. For example, an endowment fund for other faiths was 
established to safeguard the religious rights of minorities, while 
religious institutions and places of worship are protected and support is 
given to civil society organizations dedicated to the protection of 
minority rights and freedoms. 
The recent reports of minority rights group International and Human Rights 
Watch show that the Iraqi government is lamentably failing to protect 
minorities, and is in fact presiding over their persecution and even 
extermination. The HRC Report does not comment on the very significant fact 
that Iraq has entirely ceased to engage with the treaty bodies responsible for 
overseeing its compliance with its continuing international treaty obligations. 
The Iraqi Constitution 
Larry Diamond commented on the interim constitution of 2004 as follows: 
But the interim constitution, while impressively liberal in many respects, 
was itself produced under great pressure of time through a process 
that was not transparent. As a result, many Iraqis were deeply 
aggrieved that major constitutional principles such as federalism, 
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extensive minority vetoes, and a very limited role for religion in public 
life were being foisted upon them without debate. 
(Diamond 2005: 21) 
The Iraqi Constitution, adopted by a highly disputed referendum on 15 
October 2005, hardly stands comparison with the 1932 Declaration, which 
contained the comprehensive set of specific minority rights referred to above, 
and failed to answer the questions posed by Diamond and others. 
A word of warning: it is hard to find a definitive version in English or even in 
Arabic. UNESCO has provided a translation of the draft presented for voting 
(Final Draft Iraqi Constitution), while the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Iraq (established in August 2003) has provided an English translation of the 
final version as of 30 January 2006, following several amendments (Iraqi 
Constitution).3 
In its final version the Constitution provides the following in Article 2: 
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation 
source of legislation: 
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions 
of Islam 
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy. 
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic 
freedoms stipulated in this Constitution. 
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Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the 
majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to 
freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as 
Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans. Article 3 explicitly 
recognizes that ‘Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and 
sects’. 
As Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala point out (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 
40–41), this fudges the role of religion in the state. It is entirely unclear how 
the ‘rule of Islam’, ‘principles of democracy’ and ‘rights and basic freedoms’ 
are to be weighed against each other, or, indeed, what they are intended to 
mean. 
Article 4(1) provides, 
The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official 
languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their 
mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Syriac, and Armenian shall be 
guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with 
educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational 
institutions. 
‘Educational guidelines’ are nowhere defined. The right to mother tongue 
education is an empty promise in this Constitution. 
Article 14 prohibits discrimination: ‘Iraqis are equal before the law without 
discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, 
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religion, sect, belief or opinion, or economic or social status’ when they 
manifestly are not. 
Most important for the purpose of this article is Article 125, in Chapter 4, on 
local administrations, which provides, ‘This Constitution shall guarantee the 
administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the various 
nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other 
constituents, and this shall be regulated by law’. 
No such law has yet been enacted. 
Not only does the 2005 Constitution fall far short of the 1932 Declaration in 
precision and enforcement mechanisms, it is the legal framework that has 
accompanied the disaster that has befallen Iraq’s minorities since 2003. 
Conclusion 
Toby Dodge identifies four interlinked structural problems that have 
dominated Iraqi politics from 1920 until 2003. The fourth is ‘[…] the 
exacerbation and re-creation by the state of communal and ethnic divisions 
as a strategy of rule’ (Dodge 2005: 169). It is, sadly, the case that this method 
of rule was introduced by the British, as the default colonial response to 
complexity. The monarchy ruled in the same way, and the Ba’ath Party was 
defined by exclusive Arab nationalism. This article has shown in detail how 
the occupation followed by the regime since 2005 has created the conditions 
for a disaster for Iraq’s minorities. How will this change? A break-up of Iraq 
into three entities may well happen, but for the minorities this is highly unlikely 
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to improve their situation. Nor is it likely that a new golden age will be created 
by punctilious compliance with UN standards. 
It may be that Iraq’s future will be closely linked with that of Iran, its former 
ruler. Iran’s population, at some 78,000,000, is more than double that of Iraq. 
But its population is far less ethnically homogenous, even if 93 per cent are 
Muslim, 89 per cent of them Shia. According to the CIA Factbook (CIA 
2010b),4 Iran has just 51 per cent Persian, 24 per cent Azeri, 8 per cent Gilaki 
and Mazandarani, 7 per cent Kurd, 3 per cent Arab, 2 per cent Lur, 2 per cent 
Baloch, 2 per cent Turkmen and 1 per cent other. In terms of language use, 
58 per cent use Persian and Persian dialects, 26 per cent Turkic and Turkic 
dialects, 9 per cent Kurdish, 2 per cent Luri, 1 per cent Balochi, 1 per cent 
Arabic, 1 per cent Turkish and other 2 per cent. Until 1813, following two 
Russo-Persian wars, contemporary Azerbaijan was part of Persia, and the 
seventeen million Azeris in modern Iran greatly outnumber the entire 
population of Azerbaijan at just over eight million. 
At the present moment a paradoxical and contradictory process is taking 
place in the region. It is apparent that Iranian influence in Iraq is much 
stronger since 2003, and southern Iraq may be seen to be under Iranian 
control. At the same time, however, Iran itself is far from stable, with an 
increasingly politicized and numerous youth: 24 per cent of the population are 
14 or younger. However, the equivalent population of Iraq is 40 per cent. For 
established hierarchies this is very bad news. And ethnic consciousness 
grows ever stronger in Iran. 
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The only firm prediction that can be made, therefore, for Iraq is a future of 
much greater turbulence. The – very young – people of Iraq will decide the 
fate of the territory. It is to be hoped that the eventual future will provide a 
peaceful home for Iraq’s diverse ethnicities and religious groups. 
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